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Abstract 
A significant union presence in the Las Vegas, Nevada Hotel, Gaming, and 
Recreation (HGR) industry juxtaposed to the near absence of unions in the 
Reno, Nevada segment of the same industry is used to study how unions affect 
wages both within the industry and in a much less unionized sector, the 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (WRT) industry. The results indicate that median 
wages of highly unionized occupations in the Las Vegas HGR industry are 
significantly higher than wages of identical occupations in Reno. Little 
difference in wages is observed in the WRT industries of the two regions. In 
light of recent government scrutiny of gaming in the United States, managers 
must become more sensitive to alleged negative socio-economic impacts of 
their operations. Higher wages as a result of unionization may mitigate one 
element of such alleged effects. 
Keywords: Hotel and Casino Industry; Union Wage Effects; Service Sector 
Employment 
Introduction 
Recently, the National Gaming Impact Study Commission (1999), 
established by Public Law 104-169, investigated the multidimensional impacts 
of gaming on customers, workers, and communities across the United States. 
Many industry analysts predicted that the Commission's findings would become 
a catalyst for extending federal regulation into the industry based on findings 
and perceptions that unacceptably high social and economic costs accompany 
the operation of gaming enterprises. According to some researchers, such costs 
range from psycho- and socio-pathologies related to compulsive gambling to 
labor market distress because of the abundance of jobs created in the hotel-
casino sector that are potentially unstable, part-time, low paying, and offer few 
fringe benefits (Alexander, 1998; Thomson, Gaze!, and Rickman, 1997; 
Waddoups, 2000a). 
In light of the Commission's findings, it appears that owners and managers 
ofhotel-gaming operations may find it in their self interest to become more 
sensitive to the impact of their enterprises on social and economic well-being of 
the communities in which they operate. More importantly, industry leaders must 
pay more attention to potential negative external effects of their enterprises and 
find methods to minimize such costs. A strategy of denial or avoidance of self-
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scrutiny is likely short-sighted, and may invite costly economic and political fallout 
similar to that recently experienced by the tobacco industry. 
Of course, managers of hotel-gaming operations must be sensitive to a complex array 
of overlapping and often conflicting interests, which include interests of stockholders, 
political leaders, community groups, workers, unions, and their customers. If a critical 
mass of community interests comes to believe that gaming enterprises generate more 
social and economic costs than benefits for their communities, increased government 
intervention and control will likely follow. 
When socio-economic costs are examined in the context of gaming, the discussion 
generally has focused on pathological gambling and the accompanying costs borne by the 
community. In contrast, the present study addresses social and economic costs and 
benefits from the perspective of employees. If a substantial proportion of hotel-casino 
employees work in jobs that pay at or below the poverty level, socio-economic costs 
stemming from inadequate health care, lack of affordable housing, family instability, lack 
of resources for child care, among others, are borne by the workers, their dependents, and 
the community. 1 Such costs are especially salient for communities with a relatively large 
proportion of employment attributable to the gaming industry. 
More specifically, the present study addresses the ability of labor unions to increase 
wages of front-line hotel-casino workers. By comparing occupational wages in a highly 
unionized (Las Vegas) with a location virtually union-free (Reno), union impact on wages 
is assessed. If substantially higher wages are observed in the unionized location while 
poverty level wages are observed in the less unionized area, then unions may be 
understood, in part, as institutions that reduce the social and economic costs connected 
with low wage employment. 
Undoubtedly managers are reluctant to accept contractual restrictions that 
unionization places on their ability to operate. Furthermore, stockholders generally prefer 
higher short-term profits that generally accrue in the absence of unions. However, if 
increased economic stability for a significant portion of the community's residents 
accompanies union scale wages and benefits, then social and economic costs that may 
otherwise have been borne by the community can be avoided. Reduction in such costs 
will likely increase the industry's acceptability to community residents, which in turn 
raises the probability that it will continue to thrive economically in the long term. 
The findings reported in the present study are relevant to hotel-casino managers and 
union leaders, who both have a direct interest in maintaining the long run viability of the 
industry. In addition, policy makers, who make regulatory decisions affecting the 
industry, and academic researchers, who study managerial and socio-economic issues 
connected with the hospitality industry, should also find the study of interest. 
Unions and Wages from the Perspective of Economic Studies 
Economists and industrial relations scholars have demonstrated quite conclusively 
that unions raise the wages of the workers they represent (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; 
Hirsch & Macpherson, 1997). Evidence of the union wage effect on workers without 
union coverage, however, is not so clear. Such ambiguity arises because unions in a labor 
market affect nonunion wages while they raise union wages. For example, citing the 
union threat effect, some economists have suggested that firms that prefer to remain 
nonunion will increase wages of nonunion workers strategically to reduce the probability 
1 For example, Waddoups (1999a) studied patterns of uncompensated health care among patients and guarantors at the local 
public hospital in Las Vegas, which provides approximately one-half of the uncompensated health care in the area. As the 
location's only safety-net hospital, it must treat patients regardless of their ability to pay. The study revealed that workers 
employed in hotel-casino jobs at "Strip" properties, a highly unionized location, were substantially more likely to pay their 
medical bills than workers employed in off- "Strip'" hotel-casinos, which are mostly nonunion. The lack of affordable benefits 
for workers and their dependents in off- "Strip" establishments is the likely reason for the difference. Costs associated with 
uncompensated health care are transferred from firms, which pay low wages and provide no benefits, to the community 
through higher prices for medical care, higher insurance premiums, and higher taxes than would otherwise be observed. 
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of a successful union organizing drive. 2 Unions may also raise the relative 
wages of nonunion workers through increased consumer demand at nonunion 
firms. The demand for nonunion workers is theorized to increase because 
consumers shift from goods and services produced in the (presumably) higher 
cost union sector toward goods and services produced in the (presumably) lower 
cost nonunion sector. Such a substitution is expected to increase the demand for 
nonunion labor and put upward pressure on wages in the nonunion sector, other 
things equal. 
Labor economists have also formulated the wage relativity hypothesis to 
explain why union and nonunion workers' wages do not diverge more than is 
currently observed. For example, Freeman & Medoff(1981) suggested that 
nonunion workers in an industry with substantial unionization observe wages in 
the union sector and set their labor supply price accordingly. Nonunion firms are 
forced to raise wages closer to the union scale to elicit the necessary effective 
labor supply. Workers who see the union scale as fair will not provide the same 
level of quality adjusted work for significantly less compensation. 
Researchers have also hypothesized that unions affect nonunion wages 
through a spillover effect. The spillover hypothesis suggests that if unions 
increase the price of labor, one would expect disemployment in the union sector. 
Reduced demand for workers in the union sector in tum increases the supply of 
labor available to the nonunion sector, which is expected to depress wages of 
nonunion workers relative to their unionized counterparts. Although the 
disemployment envisaged in the union spillover model may remain within the 
highly unionized industry, it may also be diffused broadly across industries that 
demand labor of similar skill levels (Cain, Becker, McLaughlin, & Schwenk, 
1981, pp. 225-226). Herz ( 1990), for example, reported that one-half of the 
workers displaced in 1983-88 (not necessarily because of high union wages) 
who later became re-employed, took jobs in another industries. Thus, if 
disemployment occurs because of high union wages, increased labor supply may 
be observed in the nonunion sector, not only in the industry in question, but in 
an array of industries that use the same quality of labor as the highly unionized 
industry. 
In industries outside the highly unionized industry, where the threat of 
unionization may not be credible, the spillover effect may be a more dominant 
factor. The predicted net effect would be a relative decline in wages in such 
industries. Declining wages as a result of the spillover effect would be 
especially likely if collective bargaining were structured along industrial lines, 
as is the case in Nevada's Hotel, Gaming, and Recreation (HGR) industry. 
The HGR Sector in Nevada 
The above review of how the presence of unions in an industry may affect 
wages suggests that such effects run through a number of channels. A case study 
of union wage effects was conducted that focuses specifically on two industries 
and two cities- The HGR and Wholesale and Retail Trade (WRT) industries in 
Las Vegas and Reno, the two metropolitan areas ofNevada.3 The study of 
unions and wages in these two local industries and cities is compelling for a 
number of reasons. First, the structure of the two industries and their patterns of 
unionization make it amenable for examining how occupational wages in a less 
: Hundley (1987) presented a formal model of firm behavior in response to the union threat. Curme & 
Macpherson "s ( 1991) fmdings provide empirical support for the model. 
3 The WRT industry is chosen as a comparative because its occupational configuration most closely matches the 
configuration in HGR. Other industries defined in the state wage survey data that proved less useful for 
comparison purposes are "Mining," "Manufacturing," "Transportation. Communications and Public Utilities,'" 
"Finance, Insurance and Real Estate," "Services (excluding HGR)," "State Government," and "Local 
Government." 
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unionized labor market, like the HGR industry in Reno, differ from HGR wages in Las 
Vegas, a more highly unionized sector. 
Both locations owe a substantial part of their employment to the HGR industry. In 
Clark County, home of Las Vegas, 26.4 percent of direct employment is located in the 
HGR industry (Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation 
(NDETR), 1996).4 Of the estimated 144,979 jobs in the HGR industry at the time nearly 
45,000 were covered by union contracts.5 Workers in Las Vegas's hotel industry who 
were not covered under a union contract also benefit from working in a highly unionized 
branch of the industry. Nonunion workers in Las Vegas earned approximately 40 percent 
more than their nonunion counterparts elsewhere in the U.S., while their unionized 
counterparts earn similar wages to other unionized hotel workers elsewhere in the U.S. 
(Waddoups, 1999c). The resulting union-nonunion wage differential for workers outside 
of managerial, professional, and technical employment in Las Vegas is virtually 
nonexistent. The relative equality of wages across union and nonunion establishments 
suggests that some combination of the threat, nonunion demand, and wage relativity 
effects outweigh the spillover effect. Thus wages of union and nonunion workers in Las 
Vegas converge at a relatively high level. 6 
In stark contrast to the highly unionized HGR industry in Las Vegas, the industry in 
Reno located approximately 500 miles to the northwest is largely nonunion, and provides 
a unique opportunity for a comparative analysis. An interview with a union official in 
Reno revealed that only one hotel property (Circus Circus) with a bargaining unit of 
approximately 500 workers operated under a union contract in 1996. Five-hundred 
workers fill about 1.6 percent of the HGR jobs in Reno, a number that amounts to an 
estimated 30,584 (see Table 1). Compare a 1.6 percent union coverage rate in Reno to 
Las Vegas, where roughly 31 percent of the entire H GR workforce is covered. Although 
the HGR industry accounts for proportionally less employment in Reno, its estimated 18 
percent share of employment is not trivial, and clearly makes it a major center of hotel-
casino employment in both the state and the nation. 
Second, the configuration of the two industries and labor markets allows one to 
address whether the high level of unionization in Las Vegas's HGR sector exerts any 
discernable impact on wages in the WRT industry through threat, nonunion demand, 
wage relativity, or spillover effects. The WRT industries in both locations are not highly 
unionized and compete for less-skilled labor with the HGR industries from the same 
local labor markets. 7 If threat, nonunion demand, and/or wage relativity effects extend 
across industry boundaries and outweigh spillover effects, then one would expect 
occupational wages in the Las Vegas's WRT industry to be higher than wages in Reno's 
branch of the industry. On the other hand, if spillover effects dominate, higher wages in 
Reno's WRT industry are expected, other things equal. 
Employment in the WRT sector in Clark County is smaller than employment in the 
HGR industry, but still accounted for 95,954 jobs in 1996. The WRT industry in Reno 
has an estimated 36,065 jobs, which makes it slightly larger than its HGR sector (30,584 
jobs). Nonetheless, both industries in each location are quite large as a proportion of total 
employment. Third, the present study differs from recent research on union wage effects, 
because occupational level data from a state wage survey are used rather than individual 
. level data from a nationally representative sample.8 Kochan & Helfman (1981) suggested 
' Throughout the article Clark County and Las Vegas are used interchangeably, as are Washoe County and Reno. 
5 The employment figures were obtained from NDETR (1996, p. 75). Figures on union coverage were obtained from union 
officials and reflect coverage as of 1996. 
6 The average union-nonunion differential in U.S. hotel industry for nonmanagerial, nonprofessional/technical workers is 18.7 
percent. In Las Vegas the differential ranges from -3.8 to 4.6 percent depending on the specification of the wage equations 
used in multi-variate statistical analysis (Waddoups, 1999b). 
' Data used came from the Current Population Survey- Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) files for 1995 and 1996 to 
generate point estimates of union density for the WRT industry statewide and in Clark and Washoe Counties. The estimates 
were 7.6 percent statewide, 8.2 percent in Clark County, and I 0.2 percent in Washoe County. Small sample sizes may 
produce some measurement error in the estimates, but they conform to expectations in light of national figures from Hirsch & 
Macpherson (1997). The CPS data are commonly used to generate familiar labor market statistics such as the monthly 
unemployment rate. 
8 Use of aggregated occupational and industry data to test for union wage effects was common in earlier studies cited in the 
classic work of Lewis (1963). 
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Table 1 
Standard Industrial Classifications for Industries and Other Information on the Data Used 
in the Analysis 
HU I EL~. GAMING ANU Kt::l;t'(t::A II UN (HGR) 
Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps 
and Other Lodging Places 
Amusement and Recreation Services 
ISAf\t1F'L_E INFORMAll_QN 
!Clark County (Las Vegas) 
Firms 
Industry Size 
Survey Size 
Survey Responses 
Response Rate 
823 
186 
54 
29.0% 
Employees 
144,979 
135,481 
34,678 
WHULt::t;AL;_ A~ R_E_J_ ~ I KAUt:: (WR I ) 
Wholesale Trade:Durable Goods 
Wholesale Trade: Nondurable Goods 
Building Materials, Hardware, 
Garden Supply, Mobile Home Dealers 
General Merchandise Stores 
Food Stores 
[Automotive Dealers and Gasoline 
Service Stations 
[Apparel and Accessory Stores 
Home Furniture, Furnishings, and 
Equipment Stores 
Eating and Drinking Places 
!Miscellaneous Retail 
I~AMI-'Lt:: INFURMA II UN 
11..-lark County (Las Vegas) 
Firms 
6,225 
653 
141 
Industry Size 
Survey Size* 
Survey Responses 
Response Rate 21.6% 
Employees 
95,954 
49,649 
9,163 
Washoe County (Reno) Washoe County (Reno) 
Firms Employees -'F-:ir'"'m".>s'=-__ _,E""m-'-":'pl':'oy'-:'e':'e~s 
Industry Size 386 30,584 Industry Size 2,609 36,065 
Survey Size 62 28,616 Survey Size 235 18,925 
Survey Responses 21 11,280 Survey Responses 80 7,716 
Response Rate 33.9% Response Rates 34% 
Source: Nevada Wages: An Occupational Wage Survey of Selected Nevada Regions and Industries, 
Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation, 1996. 
*Surveys given only to firms with 30+ employees. 
that neither the approach using occupational nor individual level data is inherently 
superior; although they pointed out that the two approaches provide different 
information. The more common approach focuses on the individual as the unit of 
analysis and estimates what a worker at a given point in time with a given set of 
characteristics would earn in the presence of, and absence of, union coverage. To the 
extent that such estimates of the union wage effect do not account for changes in hiring, 
training, and other human resource policies that may have occurred over time in response 
to the union presence, estimates of the union wage effect may be biased, arguably 
downward. 
In contrast, using occupational level data allows the researcher to assess how 
changes in human resource practices that occur as a result of unionization may have 
affected wages connected to jobs (rather than individuals) over time. Such a methodology 
makes it more conducive to estimating the total historical effects of unionism on wages. 
Consider how firms alter human resource policies in response to higher union wages. It is 
likely that firms begin to screen applicants more carefully and consequently hire more 
productive workers. Firms may also offer additional training so that wages and 
productivity are in closer alignment. If some of the changes in productivity-related 
characteristics originating from altered human resource practices are observed in the data 
at the individual level and are controlled for in multi-variate analysis (a technique 
commonly used to assess union wage effects), then the impact of unions on wages will be 
understated. For example, the source of higher wages may be attributed to more 
education or increased training. However, because the occupational wage incorporates 
employers' responses to unionism over time, it allows the researcher to obtain a better 
measure of the total historical effects ofunions on wages, a measure which is better 
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suited for estimating what may have occurred in the absence of unions, or what may 
occur if unionization disappeared and human resource policies drifted back to a 
nonunion configuration.9 
Finally, as discussed in the introduction, the present study holds currency because 
the spread oflegalized gambling and its effects on the nation's social and economic 
health has resulted in more interest generally in HGR industries around the nation. The 
formation of a National Gaming Impact Study Commission itself suggests that research 
on HGR's growing importance to local, regional, and the national economies is 
becoming increasingly timely. 
Unionization in Nevada's HGR Industry 
Unionization is an important institutional feature of the labor market in Las Vegas, 
where the HGR industry employed 26.4 percent of the workforce as of the 1996 survey, 
many of which are represented by the Culinary Union, Local226 and the Bartenders 
Union, Local165. Affiliated with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
International Union, the two locals represented nearly 40,000 workers as of 1996, mostly 
at major Las Vegas "Strip" properties. Other 
unions such as the International Union of 
Operating Engineers (stationary), the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
International Association of Theatrical and 
Stage Employees, the Carpenters Union, and 
the Musicians Union of Las Vegas represent 
maintenance workers, front-desk clerks, 
drivers, stage hands, and musicians, among 
others. In all, over 48 percent of Clark 
County's nonmanagerial, nonprofessional, 
and nontechnical workers in the HGR 
In all, over 48 percent of 
Clark County's nonmanagerial, 
nonprofessional, and nontechnical 
workers in the HGR industry were unionized 
in 1996 compared to an estimate of 19 percent 
of the same group of workers nationwide 
industry were unionized in 1996 compared to an estimate of 19 percent of the same 
group of workers nationwide (Waddoups, 1999c ). 
A majority of establishments on the Las Vegas "Strip," such as Caesar's Palace, 
Circus-Circus, The Mirage, and The MGM Grand are unionized, as are a substantial 
proportion of major "Downtown" properties located on and around Fremont Street. An 
expanding segment of"Neighborhood" hotel-casinos has also emerged away from the 
tourist corridor. Such properties generally attract a higher proportion of their patrons 
from the local area and have little union presence. Pockets of isolated nonunion hotel-
casino development are also found in Clark County on the California-Nevada border 
(about 40 miles southwest of Las Vegas), in Laughlin near the Arizona border (about 70 
miles southeast of Las Vegas), and in Mesquite on the Arizona border near Utah (about 
90 miles northeast of Las Vegas). In contrast, as stated above, only one property 
representing approximately 500 workers was unionized in Reno as of 1996. 
Data and Methodology 
To examine how unions affect wages in Nevada's HGR and WRT industries, 
Nevada's state wage survey is used. The survey is conducted annually by the NDETR to 
gather data on wages and employment from a sample of private sector employers with 30 
or more employees. Table 1 (panel 1) contains a listing of the types of enterprises that 
compose the two industries. Nearly 1,100 employers representing a broad cross-section 
of industries participated in the 1996 survey. Because ofNevada's unique industrial 
structure, the NDETR formed HGR as a separate industrial category within a more 
9 Important prerequisites for the wage survey to be an effective data source for studying union wage effects in the present study 
are small union-nonunion wage differentials in Las Vegas, the virtual absence of unionism in Reno's branch of the industry, 
and a similar level of unionization in both locations in the comparison (WRT) industry. 
12 UNLVGaming Research & Review Journal • Volume 6, Issue 1 
\ 
broadly defined "Services" industry. The WRT industry was judged by the author to 
contain employers competing for similarly skilled workers in the same labor markets, 
and thus was chosen as a comparison group to the HGR industry. 
To obtain its sample of wages in HGR and WRT firms, the NDETR developed a 
random selection criterion that gave larger firms a higher probability of receiving a 
survey. Recipients of the survey were asked to list the number of workers who fit a 
particular occupational definition, the number of hours each employee worked, the 
individual rate of pay excluding tips and other compensation as of March 1, 1996, and to 
classify each worker as "entry-level" or "journey-level." Only data on "journey-level" 
workers -- those capable of working without direct technical supervision -- were 
disaggregated by county; therefore, only journey-level workers were the focus of the 
study. The NDETR sent follow-up letters to non-respondents after six weeks 
encouraging their participation. They obtained total response rates of 29.0 percent in 
Clark County and 33.9 percent in Washoe County for the HGR industry and 21.6 percent 
in Clark County and 34.0 percent in Washoe County for the WRT industry. Table 1 
(panels 2 and 3) displays information on the sample, including industry size, the number 
of firms who received a survey, and response rates. 
The official description of the data described no attempts by the NDETR to test for 
any non-response bias. It appears, however, that no patterns of non-response bias 
emerged with respect to firm size. The average size of non-respondents was slightly 
smaller in Las Vegas than the size of respondents, while just the reverse was true of non-
respondents in Reno. 
Of the HGR firms in Clark County who were sent the survey, the mean number of 
employees was 728. The mean for WRT was 76 employees, clearly a smaller number. 
The analogous numbers for employees in firms responding to the survey averaged 642 
and 65, respectively in the HGR and WRT industries in Washoe County, following the 
same pattern as in Las Vegas with respect to firm size. No information on the distribution 
or dispersion of firm sizes was provided, making it difficult to statistically test for 
differences in the two distributions or differences in average firm size within the two 
industries. The responding firms, however, represented 24 percent of the HGRjobs in 
Clark County's sampling universe and 10.5 percent of the WRT jobs in Clark County. 
The analogous figures for Washoe County are 36.9 for HGR and 19.9 for WRT. 
Another potential source of non-response bias is under- or over-representation of 
firms by union status. The NDETR reported no information on union status. While lack 
of such information is not a problem in Reno because of the near absence of 
unionization, circumstances are different in Clark County. One piece of evidence 
suggesting that unionized firms were probably not undercounted was that median wages 
of many of the key, highly unionized occupations were identical with the union wage 
scale in typical contracts (Waddoups, 2000b, Table 2). Whether such firms were over-
represented in the sample is more difficult to determine. The fact that not all median 
wages of generally unionized occupations in the survey corresponded exactly with the 
union scale, however, does suggest a significant participation of nonunion firms in the 
survey. The lack of data on firm characteristics makes it difficult to say anything 
definitive about non-response bias along the union dimension. 
From employers' survey responses, the NDETR calculated means, medians, and 
interquartile ranges of a wide array of occupational wages in the two counties. To 
facilitate comparison, only occupations whose wages appeared in both locations were 
included, which left 51 pairs of occupation-industry median wages from HGR and 35 
pairs from WRT in the final sample. 
Median wages for occupations in Clark and Washoe County's HGR industry are 
compared in Table 2. For most occupations outside the Managerial and Professional 
categories the sample sizes are quite large, which increases the precision of the estimates 
of median wages. Notice also that the sample sizes are substantially larger in Las Vegas 
because of the larger size of the industry. In addition to information on median wages in 
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Las Vegas and Reno, Table 2 contains the difference and percent difference in the median 
wage for each occupation. The percent difference is calculated using Reno's wage as the 
denominator (the practice of placing the nonunion wages in the denominator is common 
in the literature measuring union-nonunion wage differentials). The final column in Table 
2 indicates occupations where a substantial union presence exists. Of the 51 occupations 
listed for the HGR industry, 21 are considered "highly unionized" in Clark County. 10 
Table 2 
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County {Las Vegas) and Washoe County {Reno) 
{Hotel, Recreation, and Gaming) 
Num. of Num. of Num. of Num. of Union 
Firms Workers Median Firms Workers Median Perc. in 
Occupation Clark Clark Clark washoe Washoe Washoe Diff. Diff. Clark ctx 
Managerial and Administrative Occugations 
Chefs, Executive 15 17 29.38 10 14 21.92 7.46 34% no 
Managers, Casino 13 26 19.94 7 15 20.03 -0.09 0% no 
Managers, Financial and Controllers 28 50 23.04 14 23 24.87 -1.83 -7% no 
Managers, Food and Beverage 26 99 13.52 10 21 15.18 -1.66 -11% no 
Managers, General and Top Executives 16 35 48.08 8 19 57.69 ·9.61 ·17% no 
Managers. Hotel 16 20 25.05 11 14 19.71 5.34 27% no 
Managers. Marketing, Advert., Pub. Relations 18 30 19.23 8 17 21.15 -1.92 -9% no 
Managers, Human Resources 19 30 20.83 8 15 20.53 0.30 1% no 
Average 307 24.88 138 25.14 -0.25 -1% 
Profess1onal Para~rofessional. and Technical 
Accountants 10 21 13.86 9 21 14.42 -0.56 -4% no 
Administrative Assts. 20 36 13.37 8 29 12.41 0.96 8% no 
Casino Hosts, Executive 8 19 20.60 6 13 18.27 2.33 13% no 
Computer Programmers 6 17 15.77 6 13 18.39 -2.62 -14% no 
Average 15.90 15.87 0.03 0% 
= 
Table 2 {cont.) 
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County {Las Vegas) and Washoe County {Reno) 
{Hotel, Recreation, and Gaming) 
Num. of Num. of Num. of Num. of Union 
Firms Workers Median Firms Workers Median Perc. in 
Occupation Clark Clark Clark Washoe Washoe Washoe Oiff. Diff. Clark Cty 
Sales and Related Occu(;!ations 
Cashiers. Casino Cage 30 486 10.01 15 185 7.04 2.97 42% no 
Change Persons, Gaming 28 1312 8.72 15 416 6.75 1.97 29% yes 
Clerks, Currency Counting 24 332 8.46 10 68 7.43 1.03 14% no 
Salespersons. Retail 13 277 7.50 5 60 7.04 046 7% no 
Average 8.67 7.07 1.61 23% 
Clerical and Administrative SuQ(;!Ort 
Bill and Account Collectors 12 30 11.71 6 16 9.17 2.54 28% no 
Clerks, Accounting 23 164 9.00 9 60 9.07 -0.07 -1% no 
Clerks, Hotel Desk 29 531 11.45 9 78 8.00 345 43% yes 
Clerks, Payroll 22 81 10.00 6 12 8.50 1.50 18% no 
Clerks, Personnel 17 48 9.00 6 12 8.43 0.57 7% no 
Clerks, Traffic, Shipping and Receiving 13 37 9.69 4 10 8.00 1.69 21%, yes 
Computer Operators 6 34 11.73 5 18 10.72 1.01 9% no 
Secretaries, Except Legal and Medical 19 88 10.45 9 54 10.29 0.16 2% no 
Switchboard Operators 17 235 11.25 8 57 7.04 4.21 60% yes 
Average 10.48 8.80 1.67 19% 
10 Occupations were assigned "highly unionized" status based on an examination of union contracts and after consultation with a 
former human resource executive of a major unionized hotel. In Table 2, "Union in Clark" heads this column. 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County (Las Vegas) and Washoe County (Reno) 
(Hotel, Recreation, and Gaming) 
Occupation 
SeiVice Occupations 
Baggage Porters and Bellhops 
Bakers, Bread and Pastry 
Bartenders 
Casino Hosts, Nonexecutive 
Chefs 
Cooks, Restaurant 
Cooks. Short Order 
Dealers, Blackjack 
Dealers, craps 
Dining Room Attendants Bartender Helpers 
Food Preparation and Service Workers (fast food) 
Guards, Security and Watch (unarmed) 
Hosts, Hostesses 
Housekeepers 
Janitors and Cleaners 
Keno Runners 
Keno Writers 
Kitchen Helpers, Porters, Dishwashers 
Maids and Room Cleaners 
Supervisors, Gaming 
Supervisors. Slots 
Waiters and Waitresses 
Average 
Table 2 (cont.) 
Num. of Num. of Num. of Num. of Union 
Firms 
Clark 
22 
8 
31 
11 
21 
26 
10 
23 
17 
21 
16 
23 
16 
19 
30 
11 
14 
28 
29 
22 
27 
25 
Workers Median Firms Workers Median Perc. in 
Clark Clark Washoe Washoe Washoe Diff. Diff. Clark Cty 
393 
78 
559 
52 
92 
469 
94 
2211 
718 
634 
215 
775 
197 
238 
1112 
82 
135 
815 
2254 
565 
493 
1141 
7.67 
12.37 
11.88 
13.44 
14.38 
12.07 
10.53 
4.58 
4.65 
7.21 
7.91 
10.88 
10.92 
8.75 
9.52 
6.50 
7.50 
9.37 
9.25 
19.69 
10.41 
7.44 
9.86 
6 
13 
4 
11 
13 
6 
12 
7 
11 
10 
12 
7 
12 
14 
5 
10 
17 
12 
12 
15 
15 
61 
52 
239 
24 
44 
262 
95 
1174 
208 
290 
78 
270 
94 
38 
428 
36 
132 
342 
444 
281 
238 
554 
5.22 2.45 47% 
9.62 2. 75 29% 
6.60 5.28 80% 
10.84 2.60 24% 
14.27 0.11 1% 
8.48 3.59 42% 
7.75 2.78 36% 
5.14 -0.56 -11% 
4.75 -0.10 -2% 
4.75 2.46 52% 
6.50 1.41 22% 
8.50 2.38 28% 
6.25 4.67 75% 
6.41 2.34 37% 
6.90 2.62 38% 
5.90 0.60 10% 
6.75 0.75 11% 
6.00 3.37 56% 
6.39 2.86 45% 
15.00 4.69 31% 
7.63 2. 78 36% 
4.90 2.54 52% 
7.48 2.38 32% 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County (Las Vegas) and Washoe County (Reno) 
_(Hotel, Recreation, and Gaming) 
Num. of Num. of Num. of Num. of Union 
Firms 
Clark 
Workers Median Firms Workers Median Perc. in 
,Occupation Clark Clark Washoe Washoe Washoe Diff. Diff. Clark Cty 
Production Construction. Operating. Maint. 
and Material Handling Occupations 
Maintenance Repairers. General Utility 26 256 19.22 11 123 12.42 6.80 55% yes 
Parking Lot Attendants 13 207 7 44 4 93 4.25 3.19 75% yes 
Slot Machine Repairers 26 210 16.52 12 99 12.28 4.24 35% no 
Supervisors, Maintenance Workers 19 65 16.94 8 18 16.52 0.42 3% no 
, Average 15.03 11.37 3.66 32% 
Overai!Average 13.11 11.41 1.70 24% 
Average Unionized in Clark County 10.50 7.49 3.01 40% 
Average not Uniomzed in Clark County 14.94 14.16 0. 78 6% 
'source: Nevada Wages: An Occupational Wage Survey of Selected Nevada Regions and Industries, Nevada Department of 
Employment. Training and Rehabilitation. 1996. 
Nearly identical information from the WRT industry in Las Vegas and Reno is 
compiled in Table 3. Notice that relatively large sample sizes for each occupation suggest 
that estimates of the population medians are likely to be quite reliable. Unlike Table 2, 
Table 3 does not contain a "Union in Clark" column, because union densities are virtually 
the same in both sectors and do not represent a substantial proportion of workers in 
occupations within the WRT industry in either Clark or Washoe Counties (see footnote 8). 
Table 3 
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County (Las Vegas) and Washoe County (Reno) 
(Wholesale and Retail Trade) 
Occupation 
Managerial and Administrative Occupations 
Managers, Fast Food 
Managers, Financial and Controllers 
Managers, Food and Beverage 
Managers, General and Top Exec. 
Managers, Marketing, Advert. etc. 
Managers, Sales 
Managers, Warehouse 
Average 
Num. of Num. of Num. of 
Firms Workers Median Firms 
Clark Cty Clark Cty Clark Cty Washoe 
11 
34 
24 
51 
15 
37 
21 
64 
44 
64 
89 
18 
118 
28 
11.54 
27.69 
15.00 
28.85 
23.45 
22.45 
16.27 
20.75 
Professional Paraprofessional and Technical Occupations 
Accountants 16 
14 
22 
19 
14.42 
16.45 
15.44 
Buyers, wholesale, Retail Except Farm Products 
Average 
10 
14 
12 
37 
21 
19 
7 
Num. of 
Workers 
Washoe 
54 
14 
20 
65 
10 
44 
28 
14 
13 
Median 
Washoe 
8.95 
23.6 
13.30 
28.37 
20.48 
18.79 
18.94 
18.92 
Perc. 
Diff. Diff. 
2.59 28.9% 
4.09 17.3% 
1.70 12.8% 
0.48 1.7% 
2.97 14.5% 
3.66 19.5% 
-2.67 -14.1% 
1.83 9.7% 
16.56 -2.14 -12.9% 
14.95 1.50 10.0% 
15.76 -0.32 -1.4% 
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The Impact of HGR Unions on Wages 
The results in Table 2 clearly demonstrate a substantial wage premium for workers in 
Las Vegas employed in highly unionized occupations in the HGR industry. The wage 
premium for such occupations averages 40 percent. That is, the typical worker in Las 
Vegas working as, for example, a baggage porter, kitchen helper, or guest room attendant 
(maid), among other highly unionized occupations, earns an average of 40 percent more 
in hourly wages than his or her counterparts in the identical occupations in Reno. 
Are there differences in industry characteristics in Las Vegas that generate such a 
wage premium independent of unions? If such differences exist and lead to higher wages 
independent of union status, then one may expect workers in occupations not classified as 
highly unionized in Las Vegas's HGR industry to also earn substantially higher wages 
than their counterparts in Reno. Results in Table 2 indicate that such workers enjoy only 6 
percent higher median wages on average relative to their co-workers in identical 
occupations in Reno. Thus some differences in wages across the two regions may arise 
from a difference in the structures of the HGR industries in the two cities favoring Las 
Vegas; however, the magnitude of the differences between the union and nonunion 
occupations (40 percent compared to 6 percent) suggests that union representation of 
workers in Las Vegas is very likely to remain a major component of a reasonable 
explanation of higher wages observed there. 
Notice also that differences in median wages for some occupations listed in Table 2 
are quite remarkable. For example, maids and room cleaners (an untipped occupation) in 
Las Vegas enjoy a 45 percent wage premium over the same occupation in Reno. Kitchen 
helpers, porters, and dishwashers (also untipped) are typically paid 56 percent more than 
workers in the identical occupations in Reno. The largest premium, however, goes to 
workers in tipped occupations. For example, bartenders in Las Vegas receive an 80 
percent wage premium over bartenders in Reno. 
Hourly wages in the NDETR data do not include tips, which likely causes an 
overstatement of the Las Vegas-Reno differential for bartenders and other tipped 
employees. To see why an upward bias may occur, consider figures in Table 2 showing 
food servers in Reno earning $4.90 per hour while their counterparts in Las Vegas earn 
$7.44 per hour, a 51.8 percent premium for workers in Las Vegas. Now, add a hypothetical 
$10.00 per hour in tips to each wage. The wage premium drops to 17 percent. Table 2 
shows that tipped occupations generally exhibit the largest wage differentials, which 
suggests that using only the base wage may overstate the union effect. The NDETR data, 
however, also do not include fringe benefits, which likely tends to offset any upward bias 
from the exclusion of tips. Furthermore, Waddoups (1999c) demonstrated that differences 
in the distribution of median wages among occupations with a union presence in Las 
Vegas and the identical occupations in Reno was statistically significant. 
A finding of higher wages in Las Vegas compared to Reno is not particularly 
surprising in light of previous research demonstrating that the extent of unionization in an 
industry positively affects wages ( Belman & Voos, 1993; Cain, Becker, McLaughlin, & 
Scwhenk, 1981; Delaney, 1981; Freeman & Medoff, 1985; Perloff & Sickles, 1991). But 
the studies cited above used individual level data and were able to control for 
productivity-related characteristics such as experience, education, and job tenure. The 
present study partially controls for variation in such characteristics by using the median 
wage of an occupation as the unit of analysis. For example, it is doubtful that sufficient 
differences exist in the characteristics of the median guest room attendant in Las Vegas 
compared to her counterpart in Reno that would warrant a 45 percent wage premium. 
Other differences in the two markets that may be responsible for differences in wages will 
be discussed below. 
Results in Table 2 leave little doubt that union representation among occupations in 
Las Vegas's HGR industry has a profound effect on wages and the wage structure within 
the HGR industry. Higher wages and benefits that are provided for in union contracts 
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increase living standards and reduce social costs associated with higher levels of 
employment at poverty level wages (refer back to footnote 2 for an example). 
But does the existence of such an effect influence wages in other sectors of the 
economy? To determine the impact on other industries, refer to median wages for 
matched pairs of 35 occupations in the WRT industry in Las Vegas and Reno displayed in 
Table 3. As mentioned earlier, unions are not dominant in either geographic location in 
the WRT industry and the union density is comparable in both areas, thus median wages 
are not consistent with the union scale in either Las Vegas or Reno. Results in Table 3 
indicate that in occupations listed under the "Clerical and Administrative Support," 
"Services" and "Production, Construction, etc." categories; that is, in occupations in 
which non-HGR firms are most likely to be competing for workers with HGR firms, 
there appears to be somewhat of a wage advantage for occupations in Reno. For example, 
the typical clerical worker in Las Vegas makes 8.9 percent less than his or her counterpart 
in Reno. The analogous figure for "Services" and "Production" categories is .9 and 6.2 
percent less, respectively. Overall, workers in Las Vegas's WRT are paid 2.2 percent less 
than their counterparts in Reno. Waddoups (1999c) found no statistical significance at 
conventional levels for such differences, although results on clerical workers came close 
to statistical significance with a p-value of .063. Compare these results to a 24 percent 
wage advantage for workers in Las Vegas's HGR industry. Overall, higher union wages in 
the HGR industry in Las Vegas do not seem to translate into lower wages in its WRT 
industry via the spillover effect as defined above. Nor does the heavy unionization 
increase wages in the WRT as the threat, consumer demand, and wage relatively 
hypotheses would suggest, although the possibility remains that the two opposing forces 
cancel each other out. 
The evidence presented here seems to contradict the findings of Kahn (1978), who 
also compared a highly unionized city (San Francisco) with a less unionized city (Los 
Angeles), finding that nonunion service sector workers in San Francisco earned 
significantly lower wages than their nonunion counterparts in Los Angeles. Other studies 
either found no evidence of inter-industry effects (Hirsch & Neufeld, 1987; Hundley, 
1987) similar to the present study, or a positive correlation between union density and 
wages of nonunion workers (Curme & Macpherson, 1991; Neumark & Wachter, 1995).1t 
must be remembered that even though some workers in the WRT industry are unionized, 
because the union density is quite low, the median occupational wage most likely reflects 
pay resembling a nonunion wage. 
It appears that higher union wages in the HGR industry do not obviously come at the 
expense of other similarly-skilled workers outside the industry. Such a finding is 
important for policy makers, conununity leaders, union leaders, and managers in the 
gaming sector, who must consider the complexities of the union wage effects on the 
social and economic well-being of the community as a whole. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Higher wages in a vast majority of cases translate into higher living standards. 
Workers in the HGR industry where wages are higher and fringe benefits are more 
It appears that higher union wages in the 
HGR industry do not obviously come at the 
expense of other similarly-skilled workers 
outside the industry. 
readily available are more stable, less likely 
to rely on services provided at the 
community's expense, and more likely to be 
active participants in the economy and 
society. To the extent that a union wage 
premium encourages such outcomes, fewer 
social and economic costs are likely to be 
I borne by the conununity. Thus from a socio-economic perspective, especially in the HGR industry with its abundance of jobs at the lower end of the skill hierarchy, union representation and the accompanying wage 
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premium may alleviate some (though certainly not all) of the socio-economic costs that 
would otherwise be borne by the community. 
Any conclusions derived from the present analysis must be interpreted in light of 
differences in the economies of Las Vegas and Reno that may affect wages independent 
of unionization. Because only two regions and two industries are the subject of study, the 
discussion must remain qualitative. Examples of factors that may cause wages to differ 
are the regulatory environment, industry structure, employment composition, 
employment and population growth, unemployment, cost-of-living, city size, and 
variation in non-pecuniary amenities. 
The Nevada State Gaming Control Board regulates gaming operations in Nevada 
according to a uniform set of rules consistently applied to hotel-casinos throughout the 
state, rendering the regulatory playing field in Las Vegas and Reno level. Differences in 
wages, therefore, are not influenced by variation in regulatory policy. 
In the present context, industry structure refers to the degree of market power hotel-
casinos enjoy in their respective regions. Previous research has demonstrated that 
oligopolistic market structures are generally characterized by higher than normal profit 
margins. Because higher profits reduce firms' will to resist union wage demands and 
allow union negotiators to push for increased wages with fewer negative employment 
effects, workers in such industries often capture a portion of extra-normal profits through 
higher wages (Stewart, 1990). 
A readily available measure of market power for hotel-casinos in the two regions is 
profitability. Hotel-casinos in Reno generated higher profit margins than their 
counterparts in Las Vegas for 5 of the 7 years between 1990 and 1996, indicating the 
possible existence of monopoly rents for capture by HGR workers in Reno. On the other 
hand, figures describing revenue-per-employee are substantially lower in Reno, 
suggesting that hotel-casinos may not have the cash flow to pay higher wages in Reno, or 
perhaps that casinos in Las Vegas have substituted capital for relatively expensive union 
labor (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 1990-96). 
Though hotel firms in Reno are definitely smaller than their counterparts in Las 
Vegas, the top 10 firms with respect to employment in both locations each employ more 
than 500 workers, which was a figure used by Podgursky ( 1986) as the lower bound in 
the definition of "large" firms. 11 The industry structure in Las Vegas and Reno differs to 
some extent, but no compelling evidence emerges to indicate that market structures in the 
two areas diverge to the point that comparison of wages in the two areas becomes unduly 
problematic. 
Employment composition in the local labor market may also affect wages in the two 
areas (Kahn, 1978). Using national data, Hirsch & Macpherson (1997) demonstrated that 
wages vary substantially by industry. If a region has a high concentration of employment 
in high wage industries, other things equal, wages in lower paying industries may be bid 
upwards. The most notable differences in employment composition between Clark and 
Washoe Counties are in the construction, manufacturing, HGR, and public administration 
industries. Washoe County employs a greater share in manufacturing and public 
administration and Clark County employs a larger proportion in construction and HGR. 
According to Hirsch & Macpherson ( 1997), average hourly wages in construction and 
manufacturing were $13.66 and $14.33, respectively, while wages in public 
administration averaged $16.06. The average wage in the service industry, which includes 
HGR, is $13.29. The fact that employment in Las Vegas tends toward lower paying 
industries (construction and services) points to greater upward pressure on wages in 
Reno's branch of the HGR industry. Such results suggest that industry composition is not 
a compelling explanation of the observed wage differentials. 
Another possible determinant of higher wages in the Las Vegas HGR industry is the 
higher rate of employment growth in the area. Employment grew at an average of 5.48 
11 Reno's lOth ranked hotel in terms of employment employs 850 workers (NDETR. 1998). 
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percent annually in Las Vegas compared to 1.95 percent in Reno over the 1989-95 period 
(Nevada Department of Administration, 1996). Of course, expansion in labor demand 
raises wages only if labor supply grows more slowly. Population expanded at a 5.40 
percent annual rate in Las Vegas, a rate slightly lower than the growth of employment at 
5.48 percent. Reno's population grew at a 1.96 percent rate, nearly identical to its 1.95 
percent rate of expansion in employment (Nevada State Demographer's Office, 1998). 12 
Using population and employment as proxies for labor supply and demand, it appears that 
more upward pressure on wages is expected in Las Vegas, though the slight .08 
percentage point difference in annual employment and population growth rates is not 
particularly compelling. 13 
The unemployment rate also summarizes supply and demand conditions in a labor 
market. A significantly higher unemployment rate in one of the regions would lead one to 
expect downward pressure on wages. Over the relevant period, higher unemployment 
rates were experienced in Las Vegas. 14 Tighter labor markets, thus, would lead to an 
expectation of greater upward pressure on wages in Reno. Thus, unemployment rates 
remain oflittle use in explaining the lower wages in Reno's HGR industry. 
Differences in living costs are another factor that may influence wage differentials. 
Other things equal, wages are expected to be positively correlated with living costs. Cost-
of-living indicators unambiguously point to higher prices in Reno over the relevant 
period. The American Chamber of Commerce Research Association compiled cost-of-
living indexes for major U.S. cities. A city with an average cost-of-living was assigned a 
score of 100. Compared to such a hypothetical city, Las Vegas scored 1 02.6, slightly 
higher than average, while Reno scored 114.0 (Matthews, 1997). Because prices were 
approximately 10.5 percent higher in Reno according to such estimates, higher wages 
were expected there as well. Living costs, therefore, are not a plausible explanation for 
lower wages in Reno. 
Differences in city size may cause wages in Las Vegas and Reno to differ. Although 
Las Vegas and Reno were considered small cities (less than a million in population) when 
the data were gathered, Las Vegas was approaching medium-sized status (generally 
defined as 1 to 2.5 million in population). The Las Vegas metropolitan area officially 
passed the one million resident mark in 1997. Waddoups (1999b) found a union wage 
premium of 5 to 10 percent for non-managerial and nonprofessional/technical production 
hotel workers employed in medium-sized cities across the U.S. city size, thus, may 
partially explain higher wages in Las Vegas's HGR industry. 
Finally, differences in non-pecuniary amenities may be responsible for the observed 
differences in wages. Locations with a relative abundance of non-pecuniary amenities 
may be able to attract workers at lower wage levels than other locations with fewer 
amenities. Though such an argument appears plausible, to the author's knowledge no 
research that addresses the relative importance of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
characteristics between the two locations has been conducted. Furthermore, it can be 
hypothesized that higher rates of population growth and in-migration observed in Las 
Vegas compared to Reno may indicate a higher level of non-pecuniary amenities in Las 
Vegas. Additional research on the determinants of migration into Nevada that carefully 
differentiates between pecuniary and non-pecuniary motivation would be required to 
further understand the impact of non-pecuniary amenities on local wage levels. 
The discussion of how factors other than unionization may influence wage 
differences points to the difficulty in drawing a definitive conclusion on the magnitude of 
union wage effects. Not only is it difficult to judge the relative importance of each factor, 
12 Because the Las Vegas area is substantially larger than Reno, a percent increase in population adds substantially more 
individuals to the area. For example a one percent change in Las Vegas's 1999 population translates into approximately 12,500 
people. For the Reno area a one percent change means just over 3,100 people. 
" Population may be a poor proxy for expansion of labor supply in Las Vegas because of the relatively large number of new 
residents who are retirees. 
14 The NDETR reports the unemployment rates in the Las Vegas metropolitan area at 5.5 percent in 1995 and 1996. In the Reno 
metropolitan area, the rates were 4.8 and 4.6 percent for the two years. Furthermore, during no year between 1992 and 1996 
did the unemployment rate in Las Vegas fall below the rate in Reno (NDETR, 1998 J. 
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but some factors may be related to each other and to the level of unionization within the 
industry. For example, an oligopolistic market structure may increase profitability and 
wages compared to a more competitive structure, which in tum makes the profitable 
location a more attractive target for union organizing. Successful union organizing then 
generally leads to lower profitability. Although such complex interactions between 
economic variables make it difficult to arrive at clean estimates of union wage effects, 
there does not appear to be a systematic bias in the direction of higher wages in Las 
Vegas from factors other than unionization. 
The evidence presented above suggests that unions in the HGR industry substantially 
influence the wage structure, raising the relative wages of non-managerial, 
nonprofessional/technical workers. How do the high HGR wages affect pay levels of 
similarly qualified workers in other less unionized industries? The data only tentatively 
support the possibility of a mild spillover effect that outweighs threat, nonunion demand, 
and wage relativity effects, which work to reduce wages of"clerical" workers in Las 
Vegas's WRT industry. The results, however, are quite weak and may arise from such 
factors as living costs, or higher demand for clerical workers stemming from a greater 
share of government employment in Reno, among other factors not controlled in the 
methodology. 
To the extent that Washoe County's labor market is similar to the market in Clark 
County, increased union density in the HGR industry in Reno is expected to raise the 
wages of Washoe County's HGR industry workers. At the same time, little effect on 
wages of similarly skilled workers in other industries is expected. Conversely, the 
absence of unions in Las Vegas would likely lead to a reduction in wages of current non-
managerial and nonprofessional/technical workers in the HGR's highly unionized 
occupations over time as firms drifted back toward wage structures and human resource 
practices commonly found in nonunion service sector employment. The concern first 
raised in this article -the existence of social and economic costs borne by communities 
whose employment base includes an abundance of jobs paying at or near the poverty 
level -would then likely become an even more important issue for communities and the 
industry. In addition, results of the present analysis suggest that workers within the Las 
Vegas HGR industry, but employed in occupations with little or no union presence, would 
likely see little impact on their wages in response to a steep decline in unionism. Workers 
in other industries (like the WRT industry) who possess similar skills to unionized HGR 
employees, similarly, would likely see little change in wages if the current high levels of 
unionism were to be substantially diminished. 
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